Whenever China does something that harms India, a familiar set of prescriptions makes the rounds. India should sign a trade deal with Taiwan. It should sell weapons to the Southeast Asian states that quarrel with Beijing over the South China Sea and back their territorial claims. It should send its navy on patrols through those waters. It should press harder on Tibet by raising the profile of the Dalai Lama and the government in exile.

Each of these options are offered as a way for India to hit back at a larger power that keeps imposing costs on it without paying any in return. The appeal is easy to understand at a moment when India feels short of ways to respond. The trouble is that, for all their appeal, these moves do far less than their advocates suggest.

These moves are signals rather than costs, telling Beijing that India is displeased and pricking the Communist Party’s pride on issues it treats as matters of prestige, while taking almost nothing away from China that it actually depends on. A trade agreement with Taiwan irritates Beijing without denting its economy.

A warship in the South China Sea makes a point without shifting the balance in waters India cannot contest in any case. Even the sharper moves, on Taiwan and Tibet, work on the register of narrative and pride rather than material power. They wound the party’s image. They do not weaken its grip on power or its ability to act against India……..”