Bharatiya intelligence reports suggest that Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba is training fighters for waterborne “jihad” operations from the Mangla Dam in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, at a time when the Indus Waters Treaty has become a major flashpoint between Bharat and Pakistan. Security agencies in New Delhi say the development could turn shared river systems into a new theatre of cross-border terrorism, further complicating an already volatile regional water dispute.

Lashkar’s shift towards ‘water jihad’

According to security inputs cited in the TV9 Hindi report, Lashkar-e-Taiba has launched a dedicated programme to train its cadres in operations using waterways, explicitly linking the effort to tensions over the Indus Waters Treaty. In a recent address at a training camp, senior Lashkar commander Haris Dar told recruits that a 10-day basic course on water-based operations had been completed and that “the real work” would now begin, indicating a structured, phased curriculum for riverine and reservoir-centric missions. Dar reportedly framed the training as part of a broader struggle with Bharat over “water,” telling the group that Pakistan could “do something” on the issue in 2026.

Training hub at Mangla Dam in PoJK

The training is said to be taking place around Mangla Dam, one of Pakistan’s largest dams, located in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), giving militants direct access to a major reservoir and connected waterways. Bharatiya investigators had earlier linked the Mangla Dam region to training activities for the terrorists who carried out the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, making the site a known Lashkar hub from a counter-terrorism perspective. Security officials believe the combination of deep water, complex terrain and proximity to disputed borders makes Mangla ideal for rehearsing both covert infiltration and sabotage scenarios involving dams, canals and river crossings.

From Pahalgam attack to water warfare

The reported revival of Lashkar’s training infrastructure around Mangla comes in the aftermath of the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir, one of the deadliest assaults in the region in recent years. On 22 April 2025, gunmen linked to Lashkar’s proxy outfit The Resistance Front (TRF) opened fire on tourists and pilgrims near Baisaran meadow in Pahalgam, killing at least 26 people, including foreign nationals, and injuring dozens more. Intelligence assessments and open-source reports identify Saifullah Kasuri—also known as Saifullah Khalid—a senior Lashkar commander and deputy chief of the group, as the alleged mastermind behind the Pahalgam massacre, underscoring the group’s continued operational reach.

Saifullah Kasuri’s presence at the training hub

Bharatiya security sources quoted in the TV9 report say Saifullah Kasuri has been sighted at the same Mangla Dam training hub now being used for waterborne operations. Separate media investigations describe Kasuri as a close aide of Lashkar founder Hafiz Saeed, a deputy chief of the organisation, and a key figure behind proxy outfits such as TRF and the People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF), which have claimed responsibility for multiple attacks in Bharat . His alleged presence at a facility specialising in “water jihad” is seen by Bharatiya agencies as evidence that Lashkar is trying to reactivate and upgrade its old networks, integrating experienced planners of high-casualty attacks into a new operational doctrine centred on rivers and dams.

Bharat’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 under World Bank auspices, has for decades governed the sharing of six rivers in the Indus basin between Bharat and Pakistan. Under the treaty, Bharat received exclusive rights over the three eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas and Sutlej—while Pakistan was allocated the bulk of flows from the three western rivers—Indus, Jhelum and Chenab—on which its agriculture heavily depends. On 23 April 2025, one day after the Pahalgam attack, Bharat announced it was putting the treaty “in abeyance,” temporarily suspending its implementation on national security grounds and tying the move to Pakistan-based terrorism.

‘Blood and water’ and ‘not a single drop’

Bharat has framed water cooperation with Pakistan through the lens of counter-terrorism, clarifying that “blood and water cannot flow together”. In May 2025, following retaliatory Operation Sindoor strikes after Pahalgam, Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly signalled that New Delhi would not engage Pakistan on Indus waters until Islamabad acted decisively against terror networks on its soil. By June 2026, Water Resources Minister C. R. Patil was quoted as saying Bharat was working to ensure that “not a single drop of water” flows to Pakistan, a declaration that intensified fears in Islamabad.

Pakistan’s warnings of an ‘unprecedented’ water crisis

Pakistan has responded by characterising Bharat’s suspension of the treaty and subsequent actions as an “unprecedented crisis” for its water security and regional stability. Islamabad’s representatives at the United Nations and international water forums argue that Bharat’s decision to halt treaty operations, disrupt predictable river flows and withhold hydrological data has compounded climate-driven vulnerabilities in the lower riparian state. Pakistani officials note that the Indus basin provides more than 80% of the country’s agricultural water needs and supports the livelihoods of over 240 million people, warning that irregular releases and sudden variations in flows can devastate crops in Punjab and other key farming regions.

Legal battle at the Permanent Court of Arbitration

In parallel, the treaty dispute has moved into the legal arena at the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration (CoA), where Pakistan sought intervention on technical questions after Bharat’s suspension. On 15 May 2026, the CoA issued an award that, among other points, mandated minimum downstream flows into Pakistan for environmental and agricultural purposes, required early-stage sharing of hydrologic and design data, and restricted Bharat’s ability to maximise water storage at hydropower projects beyond realistic projections of installed capacity and anticipated load. Bharat has categorically rejected the CoA’s authority, branding it illegally constituted, declaring its awards null and void, and reiterating that its decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance remains in force.

Weaponisation of water and militant opportunism

Against this backdrop, Bharatiya security agencies view Lashkar’s water jihad as an attempt to exploit and amplify existing fears of water weaponisation in Pakistan and beyond. Analysts note that the concept of a “water bomb”—withholding and suddenly releasing large volumes of water to cause downstream damage—has periodically surfaced in South Asian debates, though experts caution that Bharat’s current infrastructure primarily consists of run-of-the-river hydropower plants with limited storage capacity. Nonetheless, Bharatiya and international observers warn that even smaller manipulations of timing and volume of releases, especially during dry seasons, combined with the threat of militant attacks on dams or canal systems, could significantly amplify the perception of water being used as a weapon in the Bharat–Pakistan rivalry.

Possible operational scenarios involving waterways

Security agencies in Bharat reportedly fear that Lashkar’s new training emphasis could support a range of operations: covert infiltration via rivers across the Line of Control, attacks on critical infrastructure such as dams, barrages and hydropower stations, or sabotage of irrigation canals feeding key agricultural districts. Training at Mangla Dam would give militants familiarity with large reservoirs, boat-handling, underwater movement and night operations in complex water environments, skills that could be transferred to other lakes and river systems in the broader Indus basin. With Haris Dar explicitly telling recruits that “our issue over water is with Bharat,” Bharatiya officials interpret the course as both an operational programme and a propaganda effort aimed at framing attacks as a response to treaty-related grievances.

Surveillance of camps, waterways and suspicious movements

In the wake of these intelligence reports, Bharatiya agencies say they have tightened surveillance of cross-border terror camps, riverine routes and suspicious activity in areas linked to the Indus basin and its tributaries. Particular attention is reportedly being paid to regions where river flows cross or approach the Line of Control and international border, as well as to any unusual movements near key reservoirs and canal headworks. Officials emphasize that the combination of militant training, evolving hydrological projects and the treaty’s suspension demands integrated monitoring—linking counter-terror intelligence, satellite imagery, river-flow data and local ground reports—to detect potential waterborne threats early.

Human costs: floods, droughts and politicised water

The escalation over Indus waters and the overlay of terrorism comes at a time when millions in Pakistan are already grappling with climate-driven extremes, including catastrophic monsoon floods and recurring droughts. Pakistan’s 2025 monsoon floods killed more than 1,000 people and devastated farmland in Punjab, a crisis that officials say illustrated how disruptions in river management can quickly translate into humanitarian disaster. International experts warn that politicisation of water flows—through unilateral decisions, lack of data sharing or even the threat of militant interference—risks turning a fragile hydro-climatic situation into a chronic security emergency for communities on both sides of the border.cnbc+2

Regional and global implications

The emerging nexus between cross-border terrorism and water disputes in the Indus basin is now being flagged by Pakistan at multilateral platforms as a “systemic global risk,” with calls for stronger norms on shared river governance and protection of downstream communities. At the same time, Bharat’s insistence on tying treaty cooperation to the cessation of terrorism, and its pursuit of expanded hydropower and storage projects within its territory, reflects a broader strategic recalibration of how it views transboundary water rights and security. With Lashkar-e-Taiba reportedly preparing a new generation of militants for operations on and around the water, the Indus basin increasingly appears not just as a source of life and livelihoods for hundreds of millions, but also as a potential frontline in the Bharatiya subcontinent’s evolving conflict landscape.