A serious controversy has emerged following letters linked to Speaker U.T. Khader, which reportedly seek the withdrawal of criminal cases against certain accused Islamists by describing them as innocent. This raises a fundamental concern: is a constitutional authority acting within the limits of the law or stepping into the domain of the judiciary? The office of the Speaker is expected to remain neutral, guided solely by constitutional principles, not subjective assessments or external considerations.
Serious charges cannot be brushed aside
The cases in question are not trivial. They involve charges under the Karnataka Epidemic Diseases Act, the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, and multiple serious sections of the IPC, including unlawful assembly, rioting, assault on public servants, attempt to murder, and criminal conspiracy. These are grave allegations that demand thorough investigation and judicial scrutiny. Labeling the accused Islamist as innocent through administrative communication risks trivializing the seriousness of these offenses.
Who decides innocence?
In a functioning democracy governed by the rule of law, innocence or guilt is determined by courts based on evidence, not by political or constitutional office bearers through letters. Any attempt to pre-judge ongoing cases undermines due process and raises troubling questions about interference. If such precedents are allowed, it opens the door for selective justice, where outcomes may be influenced outside the legal framework.
Advocate Girish Bharadwaj, in a strongly worded post on X, questioned Speaker U.T. Khader’s role and intent, asking whether he is functioning as a constitutional authority for all citizens of Karnataka or acting in favor of the Islamic community. He criticized the reported move to urge the Home Department to withdraw criminal cases by labeling certain accused as innocent, arguing that innocence or guilt must be determined strictly on the basis of legal evidence and the judicial process, not on religion or identity. Highlighting the seriousness of the charges involved, including provisions under the Karnataka Epidemic Diseases Act, the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, and multiple IPC sections such as 143, 147, 353, 307, 504, 427, and 120B, Bharadwaj questioned what could have justified such a recommendation from a constitutional office, given the gravity of the allegations.
Dangerous precedent of selective intervention
The most alarming aspect is the perception that such recommendations may be influenced by identity considerations rather than legal merit. If cases are sought to be withdrawn by branding certain accused as innocent without judicial determination, it erodes the principle of equality before law. Justice must remain blind to identity, religious or otherwise. Any deviation from this principle risks institutional bias and loss of public trust.
When a high constitutional office appears to intervene in criminal matters, it puts pressure on investigative agencies and the executive. It also weakens the credibility of law enforcement and judicial independence. Such actions blur the separation of powers, which is a cornerstone of democratic governance. Institutions must function within their defined boundaries to maintain public confidence.
Given the gravity of the issue, there must be clear and transparent explanations. On what basis were these accused termed ‘innocent’? What legal process justified such a recommendation? The people of Karnataka deserve answers. Upholding the rule of law is non-negotiable; justice cannot be negotiated through letters; it must be delivered through courts.
