In September 2026, a sustained wave of misleading, fabricated, and false narratives about Bharat circulated across social media, political discourse, and digital news platforms. This report documents 32 major incidents that were widely circulated by social media influencers, politicians, party-linked accounts, media portals, and anti-Bharat radical ideological networks and which were subsequently examined through fact-checking. The findings point to a recurring pattern in which incomplete information, distorted context, selective presentation, and unverified claims can shape public perceptions before the underlying facts receive adequate scrutiny.
The report is intended to bring greater transparency to this information ecosystem and to highlight how radicalist, anti-Hindu, and anti-Bharat elements rapidly form misleading narratives that can travel in the digital age. The fact-check report offers a revealing snapshot of how misinformation can be manufactured, repackaged, and rapidly circulated in Bharat’s digital information ecosystem. The report examined 32 major claims circulated during the month and found them misleading or false after verification. The scale is significant not simply because of the number of incidents, but because of the mechanisms behind them: recycled videos, manipulated graphics, false captions, misidentified locations, and politically loaded interpretations repeatedly turned genuine images or old events into apparently new stories.
The pile-up of fake-news propaganda is neither isolated nor limitless; from narratives designed to provoke political unrest to targeted propaganda aimed at discrediting the Bharatiya Sena, false claims are created and spread faster than a missile. While a few independent and selected media platforms play a crucial role in exposing and busting these myths, sections of the mainstream media often contribute to the spread of this “zoonotic” fake news, allowing misleading narratives to multiply rapidly across the information ecosystem.
The fragmented ecosystem behind fake news
The numbers show that social media was the principal engine of this misinformation cycle. Social media influencers and pages accounted for 12 of the 32 incidents (37.50%), making them the largest individual source category. Political accounts and media portals or journalists contributed 8 incidents each (25%), meaning these two categories together accounted for 16 incidents, exactly half of the documented cases. The report also recorded four RSS-related narrative cases (12.50%). Importantly, the source network was not concentrated around one giant account: 47 source appearances involved 44 distinct accounts, pages, individuals, or portals.
That dispersion makes misinformation particularly difficult to contain. The report found that 41 of the 44 distinct sources—93.18%—appeared only once, while no individual account appeared in more than two incidents. In other words, the problem is not necessarily one account producing an endless stream of falsehoods; it can operate through a network of different actors repeatedly introducing, reposting, or amplifying misleading material. The report consequently identifies media-hash and narrative-cluster monitoring as potentially more useful than simply watching the highest-volume accounts.
Mapping the narratives behind the fake news
The report further identifies PM Modi or the Modi government as a narrative focus in 9 cases (28.13%), followed by the Election Commission/electoral process in 7 (21.88%), caste, religious, or tribal identity framing in 7 (21.88%), RSS or Mohan Bhagwat in 4 (12.50%), police, Army, ITBP, or security forces in 4 (12.50%), and Ram-temple administration in 3 (9.38%).
The report’s key findings point to a broad and highly networked misinformation ecosystem rather than isolated incidents. Of the 32 documented cases, social media influencers and pages were the largest source category, with 12 incidents (37.50%), while political accounts and media portals or journalists together accounted for 16 incidents (50%). The leading theme was social issues & protests, with 9 cases (28.13%), while political, protest, and institutional-legitimacy narratives together constituted 18 cases (56.25%). The report further shows that PM Modi or his government featured in 9 incidents (28.13%), the Election Commission or electoral-process narratives in 7 (21.88%), and religious, temple, and RSS-related themes collectively in 8 (25%). Visual misinformation was particularly dominant: video appeared in 23 incidents (71.88%), with old or recycled video alone accounting for 12 cases (37.50%), while recycled content, false context, and misleading captions together represented 21 incidents (65.63%).
Four recurring media clusters generated 9 incidents (28.13%), demonstrating how the same or substantially similar narratives could be repeatedly amplified. The report also notes that Only Fact supplied the primary fact-check for 19 cases (59.38%), while its data technically identifies zero conclusively demonstrated AI-generated incidents, despite one AI-tagged entry lacking forensic evidence. Most notably, 11 incidents (34.38%) occurred between September 23 and 26, indicating an event-linked surge in misinformation. Taken together, these figures portray a misinformation environment driven heavily by recycled visual material, political narratives, institutional controversies, and rapid social media amplification, where repetition and selective context can give misleading claims an appearance of credibility and scale.

Many sources, one narrative
The “Top Fake News Spreaders” analysis shows a highly dispersed misinformation network rather than one dominated by a single high-volume account. The dataset records 47 source appearances across 44 distinct source identities, with the three most frequently recurring sources—V N Yadav (@VishwaN66027954), Priyanshu Kushwaha (@PriyanshuVoice), and India With Congress (@WICforYouth)—each appearing in 2 incidents (6.25%), together accounting for 6 incident involvements (18.75%) and 12.77% of all source appearances.
The remaining 41 sources appeared only once each, representing 93.18% of the distinct source identities, demonstrating that the dissemination was broad and fragmented rather than controlled by a single prominent account. The report also identifies one-incident appearances involving established media organizations and journalists, including The Economic Times, The Wire, The Telegraph, PTI, The Indian Express, Fair Report, Indian Observer, and Rajdeep Sardesai, among others. The key implication is that misinformation can move through a distributed chain of social media accounts, politically aligned pages, influencers, and media sources, making it more difficult to identify a single origin and allowing the same narrative to acquire wider legitimacy through repetition and cross-platform circulation.
The most powerful weapon in this ecosystem is not always sophisticated artificial intelligence. It is often an authentic photograph or video placed in a false context. Video appeared in 23 incidents, or 71.88% of the dataset, while old or recycled video alone accounted for 12 incidents (37.50%). Edited graphics represented another four cases, and visual or audiovisual formats collectively appeared in 30 incidents (93.75%). This demonstrates why misinformation can be so persuasive: viewers are not necessarily looking at fabricated imagery; they may be looking at something real that is being made to tell a completely false story.
The September timeline provides several striking examples. A video from a 2024 Jantar Mantar protest was presented as a recent demonstration against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. Fact-checking traced the footage back to an earlier protest concerning EVMs. Similarly, other old protest footage was circulated as contemporary demonstrations against the Election Commission, while an AAP protest in Mohali was presented as a general public protest against Prime Minister Modi. These cases demonstrate a simple but powerful misinformation formula: take a real crowd, remove its original date and context, attach a new political claim, and allow social media to supply the amplification.
The same mechanism extended beyond political protests. The report documented claims involving temples, the prime minister, caste, security forces, infrastructure, and economic statistics. Its stated assessment identifies recurring objectives such as creating an exaggerated impression of public unrest, damaging institutional credibility, provoking caste or religious hostility, undermining confidence in security institutions, and portraying administrative or infrastructure systems as failing. These are the report’s assessed patterns, rather than independently established motives for every individual post, but they demonstrate how apparently separate false claims can converge around broader political narratives.
The thematic distribution reinforces this picture. Social Issues & Protests was the largest category, with 9 incidents (28.13%), followed by political disinformation with 5 incidents (15.63%) and RSS-related narratives with 4 (12.50%). Defense, security, and space accounted for three incidents, while communal or religious propaganda, temple-related narratives, and infrastructure and development each accounted for two. Policies and laws, elections and voter manipulation, education, economy and finance, and diplomacy and international relations each contributed one incident.
This is where fact-checking becomes a critical line of defense. A viral claim can travel thousands of kilometers before a reader has any opportunity to inspect its origin. Fact-checkers reverse that process: they trace the original footage, check dates and locations, compare the claim with credible records, seek official clarification, and establish whether the material actually supports the caption attached to it. The report specifically notes that source tracing and historical verification were among the most operationally effective methods, precisely because recycled media constituted 37.50% of the cases. Official clarification was particularly important for claims involving GDP figures, legislation, the Election Commission, the Army, and Delhi Airport.
Another important finding cuts through the popular assumption that every modern fake video must be AI-generated. The report technically identified zero conclusively demonstrated AI-generated incidents in this dataset; one entry was placed under an AI-related subtype, but the report says it lacked AI-forensic evidence.
Ultimately, the fight against misinformation is a fight within Bharat’s own information space, where the misuse of freedom of expression, social media and public dissent can turn unverified claims into powerful narratives. Bharat’s greatest challenge is not criticism itself, but those who misuse democratic freedoms to spread anti-national narratives, distort facts, circulate recycled videos and mobilise public anger without any strong factual or reasonable basis. When social-media claims become slogans and people take to the streets based on misinformation rather than evidence, legitimate democratic protest risks being reduced to manufactured outrage. In an era when a misleading caption can reach millions within minutes, the responsibility is clear: trace the source, verify the evidence, recover the original context and challenge falsehoods with facts before they become accepted as truth.
