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Sunday, April 28, 2024

How the quarter-century long Mughal invasion of the Deccan from 1681-1707 failed

A thread on why the Mughal invasion of the Deccan that began in full force in 1681-1707 took a quarter century and still failed.

In 1677, Mughals captured Kalaburagi, which was midway between the 2 Deccan sultanate capitals- Vijayapura and Golconda. Neither had any defensible line of forts left. In contrast, the Maratha capital Satara was behind multiple chains of forts.

The Sahyadri mountain range protected Swarajya, and only 2 routes existed to march a large army. Since the southern route ran through Adilshahis, it was blocked. From 1681-84 Mughal forces in the north could be repulsed by Marathas who had to defend only 1 front.

Despite the Mughals fielding 100k+ men, the narrow passes, valleys, scarcity of fodder and water meant they could only deploy ~30k in one siege at a time. This was a force the Marathas could match and defeat in battles and sieges.

After 3 years of failed campaigns into Konkan, Aurangzeb changed strategy and went after Vijayapur. It fell in 2 years, and Golconda in 1687. At this point the southern route was now open and Marathas took heavy losses from 1687-89.

With the fall of Raigad and the death of Sambhaji Raje in 1689, Mughals were unbeatable as their strength was greatly boosted by the acquisition of the new Deccan sultan territories. By shifting the theatre of war to Gingee, Mughal logistics were stretched by 800km.

This played to Maratha strengths. Keeping strong control over their new Deccan forts AND also fighting this far required them to scatter their forces. Scattered forces were overwhelmed one by one. Forts were used an anvil to hold the enemy in place while armies hammered.

From 1691 to 1697, multiple armies lost their entire artillery train, camp baggage, thousands of horses, and a generation of veteran officers. Regular shortage of coin, food led to high rates of desertion and incompetence.

In 1703, it looked like victory was at hand for Mughals. Only a small part of Konkan forts remained with Marathas, even though they could march armies across Mughal held territory. Even Pune was partially occupied. The Gingee playbook was repeated. This time at Wagingera.

The Naik/Nayak and Marathas concentrated a vast force of 20k. Located between the southern territories and Maharashtra, it could snowball and cut Mughal forces into 2. Aurangzeb abandoned Konkan and marched south. In this absence, 6 years of conquests were undone.

Wagingera capitulated in a few months in 1705. But strategically it proved invaluable. It bought 2 years. In that interval, Marathas recaptured forts which had taken the Mughals a decade to capture. The worst was yet to come.

The high rates of casualties led to Mughals depleting their garrisons in Maharashtra and Malwa. They could offer little resistance as Maratha armies now marched into Gujarat, MP, Berar, collecting taxes or burning at will.

Morale remained high enough, that Marathas refused an offer of ceasefire to maintain status quo. They demanded chauth of the entire Deccan, Gujarat and Malwa. At this point Aurangzeb abandoned the campaign, and in 1706 began the retreat to Delhi.

In the same year, this retreating army was now attacked with alarming frequency and continued to lose men, horse and artillery. Aurangzeb’s death in 1707 unravelled what was left. The remainder rushed to Delhi for the inevitable civil war.

(This article has been compiled from the tweet thread posted by @prathgodbole on January 16, 2023, with minor edits to improve readability and conform to HinduPost style guide)

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