Sri Lanka appears to be following neighboring India’s lead in wanting to scale real-sector trade across the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor, expand energy cooperation, and host more military drills.
Sri Lankan Ambassador to Russia Shobini Gunasekera gave a brief interview about bilateral ties to TASS in mid-December. Her country is rarely discussed in reference to Russian foreign policy but is an increasingly popular destination for its tourists. Sri Lanka also defied Western sanctions on Russian oil and grain over the nearly past four years as proof of its principled neutrality towards the New Cold War. This position is deeply appreciated by Russia and creates a solid basis for further expanding their ties.
About that, Gunasekera began her interview by praising Russia for the humanitarian aid that it provided after the latest devastating cyclone to hit her island nation. She then reassured Russian tourists that Sri Lanka is ready to receive them at any time since its tourist facilities were thankfully spared from the recent disaster. Segueing into trade, she noted how it’s only around $727 million a year, heavily weighted in Russia’s favor ($550 million in exports vs. $177 million).
Russia’s exports are “primarily petroleum products, fertilizers, minerals, coal, and grain crops” while Sri Lanka’s are “primarily tea”, but she believes that seafood, fruits and vegetables, textiles, and gemstones could be exported more to Russia in the future. Although sanctions have led to some complications, Gunasekera revealed that “I had a very good discussion with representatives of the Vladivostok Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and they presented many opportunities for cooperation.”
This is likely an allusion to potential Sri Lankan participation along the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor (VCMC) that Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed in early December ahead of Putin’s visit to Delhi is one of the priority projects in Russian-Indian relations. Real-sector (as in non-energy) bilateral trade might therefore be conducted more frequently along this route in the future. Gunasekera then suggested that Sri Lankan labor could help meet Russia’s needs (just like India’s is poised to do).
Approaching the end of her interview, she spoke about her country’s interest in Russia helping it construct an LNG terminal but clarified that nothing has been agreed to yet. Rounding everything out, her last remarks were a few words about last fall’s first-ever bilateral military drills, which she suggested might become a yearly occurrence hosted by Sri Lanka since they specifically concern jungle warfare. She also seemed to hint at Sri Lanka’s openness to more visits by Russia’s Pacific Fleet.
Sri Lanka’s overall significance to Russia’s South Asian policy is obviously overshadowed by neighboring India’s, but as intuited from her interview, it appears as though Sri Lanka is tacitly following India’s lead by wanting to scale trade across the VCMC, expand energy cooperation, and host more military drills. Accordingly, it would advance all of their interests if they form a working group that meets every so often to brainstorm mutually beneficial trilateral initiatives, thus making the utmost of these opportunities.
Looking forward, while the future of Russian-Sri Lankan relations is bright, unleashing their full potential will likely require coordination with India. Its businessmen, both there and in Russia (including among its Russian-born diaspora), can play the leading role in exploiting these opportunities. If they and their partners focus their efforts along the VCMC, then more opportunities could follow, particularly if this profitable trade route attracts the interest of other countries in South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia.
(The article was published on Korybko.substack.com on January 31 and has been reproduced here)
