Many of the larger Princely States tinkered with the idea of remaining independent in the run-up to Independence. The dramatis personae who thought of this third Dominion or Princestan idea were principally the Nawab of Bhopal Hamidullah Khan, Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, egged on by the Nizam of Hyderabad.
These feudal princes were clear in their minds — why join either of the new Dominions on offer, stay out of the ambit. So Nizam in Hyderabad thought Osmanistan – he was the richest and had been accorded the title of ‘His Exalted Highness’ by the ruling British.
A jittery Nizam of Hyderabad who was living in a dream world of his own tried once again on July 9, 1947, to persuade the Viceroy to come in on his side in his fight to retain Hyderabad’s independence from both the Dominions. He dashed off a fervent and emotional missive to Mountbatten and he made a telling point in his letter, for the door appeared ajar and his understanding showed that he could kick it wide open.
The wily Nizam realised that clause 7 of the Indian Independence Bill gave him and the other bigger states leverage. He was disappointed that the British were choosing to shortchange their ‘loyal subjects’ bound by treaties for years. Of course he didn’t count for a resolute Patel who would simply not allow such a happening.
“My dear Lord Mountbatten,” the Nizam wrote to the Viceroy, “during the last few days, I have seen clause 7 of the Indian Independence Bill as reported in the Press. I regret that as so happened in recent months, the clause, though it was closely discussed with Indian leaders, was never disclosed to, much less discussed with representatives of my State.
“I was distressed to see that the clause not only contains a unilateral repudiation by the British Government of the Treaties which have for so many years bound my State and my Dynasty to the British, but also appears to contemplate that unless I join one or other of the two Dominions, my State will no longer form part of the British Commonwealth.
“The Treaties by which the British Govt many years ago guaranteed the protection of my State and Dynasty against external aggression and internal disorder have constantly been solemnly confirmed in recent years, notably by Sir Stafford Cripps in 1941. I thought I could safely rely on British arms and the British word. Having been persuaded in consequence right up to the last moment to refrain from increasing my Army and adapting my State factories for the manufacture of arms and equipment, nevertheless repudiation of clause 7 of the Bill has been made not only without my consent but without any consultation with me or my government.”
On July 16, 1947, the Secretary of State for India and Burma, the Earl of Listowel, had read out the Indian Independence Bill and therein was the contentious clause 7 that the Nizam was referring to:
“Clause 7, subsection (1) and the proviso to the clause deal with relations with the Indian States. Your Lordships will remember that the Cabinet Mission in their Memorandum of May 12, 1946, informed the States that His Majesty’s Government would in no circumstances transfer Paramountcy to an Indian Government. To that pledge we firmly adhere.
“But the time is fast approaching when the transfer of power to two Dominion governments will make it quite impossible for us to carry out our obligations towards the States, which depend for their fulfilment on the continuing responsibility of Great Britain for the Government of India. If we cannot in future discharge our obligations, we must clearly release them also from their engagements.
“We are, therefore, proposing that from the date when the new Dominions are set up the treaties and agreements which gave us suzerainty over the States will become void.
“From that moment the appointments and functions of the Crown Representative and his officers will terminate and the States will be the masters of their own fate. They will then be entirely free to choose whether to associate with one or other of the Dominion Governments or to STAND ALONE and His Majesty’s Government will not use the slightest pressure to influence their momentous and voluntary decision.
“But I think it can hardly be doubted that it would be in the best interests of their own people, and of India as a whole, that in the fullness of time all the States should find their appropriate place within one or other of the new Dominions. It would be a tragedy for India, if the States were not to enrich the Motherland to which they belong with the martial valour for which they are renowned, and which they have displayed so gallantly in two world wars, with the tradition of service that animates their rules, and with the advanced social institutions that some of them possess.
“Whatever the future relationship between the new Dominions and the States may be, it will require prolonged consideration and discussion before the final adjustment can be made. We, therefore, welcome the setting up by the Interim Government of States Departments, to handle negotiations with the Governments of the States. But the success of this negotiating machinery pre-supposes genuine goodwill and absence of suspicion on both sides.
“The assurance given by Sardar Patel, the Home Member, that it is not the desire of Congress to meddle in the domestic affairs of the States, is a welcome indication that Congress will not use its political strength to exert unfair pressure on their rulers. Sardar Patel’s statement that the federal subjects on which the States are invited to accede are limited to defence, foreign affairs and communications, and the moderation and reasonableness of his whole approach, are another sign that the Dominion of India will scrupulously respect the autonomy of the States. Mr Jinnah has also stated most emphatically that the Government of Pakistan will endorse the free choice of the States.”
The Nizam’s letter to Mountbatten went on to say:
“Your Excellency knows that while you were in England, I asked that my State should be accorded Dominion status when the British leave India. I had always hitherto felt that after more than a century of faithful alliance in which I reposed all my confidence in the British I should certainly be able to remain, without question, a member of the family of the British Commonwealth.
“Clause 7 appears to deny me even that. I still hope that no differences will be allowed to interfere between me and direct relations with His Majesty’s Govt. I was recently informed that your Excellency had undertaken to have a declaration in Parliament that the establishment of such relations can be made.
“My hope is that once established these relations will lead to a closer union between my State and the British Crown with which I have been for so many years in faithful alliance. I feel bound to make this protest against the way in which my State is being abandoned by its old ally, the British Govt. The ties which have bound me in loyal devotion to the King Emperor are being served.
“I hope Your Excellency will place my letter before HMG. I shall for the moment refrain from publishing it lest it should in any way embarrass my old friends and allies in the eyes of the world. I must nevertheless retain my right to publish it at a later stage if it should become necessary in the interests of my State.”
Neither the Viceroy, nor the Labour Government back home in Britain entertained any sympathy for Hyderabad, no matter how great his wealth, his past associations or the size of his state, to opt out of India. It was pointed out to him that HMG (His Majesty’s Government) would never accept a Dominion government, which was, as in Hyderabad’s case, completely surrounded by territory which in the circumstances would be hostile.
Mountbatten’s quick take on the matter was: It would be like Poland (referring to what happened during the Second World War, which had recently concluded) all over again. For him there was only one solution — for Hyderabad to sign up under the same three headings as had been accepted by the other Princely States, and then begin bargaining with Menon, Patel and Nehru for special concessions.
The advice was strong and solid, but the Nizam’s advisers both in his court and in the Political Department headed by that man Sir Conrad Corfield persuaded him not to take it.
He began to build up his Army to fight for his independence, confident that in the end his faithful ally — Britain — would come to his rescue. All of Mountbatten’s pleadings were in vain, not even his promise that he would secure considerable concessions from the Indian Union if the Nizam signed the dotted line, would make the stubborn Nizam change his mind.
As such, Hyderabad remained independent when British Raj ended, but as soon as their influence began to wane, Patel and Menon ambuscaded the Nizam. So long as Mountbatten remained Governor General of India, the charade of Nizam’s personal negotiations with Mountbatten continued as Patel and Menon held their hand.
Two days after Mountbatten departed from India, the Nizam indicated that he was prepared to accept the arrangement known as the Mountbatten Plan. Replied Sardar Patel who had by now hit his stride: “Tell him it is too late, the Mountbatten Plan has sailed for home.” Shortly thereafter, Operation Polo, or Police Action, was set in motion and the Indian Army moved into Hyderabad and occupied it. The Nizam was kept on as a figurehead.
Leonard Mosley writing in ‘Downfall of the Empire – The Last Days of the British Raj’, says, “As a Princely Order, their day was done and they knew it. They had been swallowed into the belly of India in a few short weeks after centuries of arrogant independence from the rest of the sub-continent. The act of gobbling them up had been a remarkable achievement on the part of India’s strategists … for it was almost bloodless … the Congress Party had two people to thank: Mountbatten for his blandishments and persuasiveness and V.P. Menon for his shrewdness in inventing the tactics and recruiting the Viceroy himself to carry them out.”
It was nothing short of the great double-cross for the Nizam who believed that the Crown Representative — Lord Mountbatten — would protect his interests at all costs. In fact, the Nizam’s belief was that he was double-crossed twice, first when the Crown and its Paramountcy didn’t come to his rescue at the time of Independence, and a second time when he tried remaining defiant and independent and his plans were circumvented by Sardar Patel and V.P. Menon using ‘police action’ to take over Hyderabad.
(Edited from an IANS article by Sandeep Bamzai, Editor-In-Chief of IANS and author of ‘Princestan: How Nehru, Patel and Mountbatten Made India’)
