“India, China, and the Teesta Basin”, India Narrative, May 26, 2026
“India and Bangladesh have long discussed the Teesta River centred on water sharing, seasonal flows, and related issues. For years, it was treated as a difficult but manageable issue within the wider framework of India-Bangladesh relations. That remains true, but it is no longer the whole picture. The Teesta now carries a significance that reaches beyond hydrology. In South Asia’s changing strategic environment, it has become a useful lens through which to understand a broader regional pattern in which infrastructure, technical cooperation, and development partnerships increasingly shape geopolitical outcomes.
Recent developments around the Teesta basin need to be read in that wider frame. In May 2026, the China-Bangladesh joint press release stated that the Bangladeshi side had sought Chinese involvement and support in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. This did not amount to a dramatic geopolitical rupture, nor should it be interpreted in such terms. Bangladesh has long pursued a multi-vector foreign policy and, like many states in the region, seeks to widen its developmental options where opportunities arise. Yet the significance of this step lies precisely in its gradualism. What is unfolding on the Teesta is not a sudden strategic realignment, but the incremental deepening of Chinese presence in a sector that has traditionally been central to India-Bangladesh engagement.
The political context of the Teesta issue is also important. In August 2024, after weeks of mass protests, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to resign and fled the country, ending fifteen consecutive years in power. Under her leadership, Bangladesh had generally pursued a friendly overture towards India and sought deeper Indian engagement with developmental projects in infrastructure, connectivity, energy, and river management. The caretaker government led by Muhammad Yunus, which took charge after her departure, marked a sharper turn. It sought to court both Pakistan and China in ways that were widely read in New Delhi as an effort to reduce Indian influence in Dhaka. The current elected government, which succeeded the caretaker administration, has continued in a similar direction, looking increasingly to China and Pakistan as preferred partners and showing greater willingness to keep India at a distance from sensitive developmental engagements, including on the Teesta……”
Read full article at indianarrative.com
