“Book Excerpt | For China, talks and conflict are part of the same strategy”, First Post, June 06, 2026
“China sees negotiation as a continuum of conflict, and there is no dividing line between war and peace. For Beijing, the combination of military, diplomatic and psychological pressure is intended to force the target state to negotiate on China’s terms and conditions. All the case studies demonstrate that China does not fight for primarily territorial or military objectives, nor does it seek prolonged conflict. Prolonged wars, as per the PLA’s Science of Military Strategy (2020), involve high political, economic and diplomatic costs; damage China’s peace-loving image and affect its relations with others, aside from the risk of military escalation. As Kissinger puts it, having demonstrated military resolve, rather, China seeks negotiation. Negotiation allows China to secure on the table what it might have been unable to secure on the battlefield.
There are two kinds of tactics that the PRC adopts in a negotiation. In the first, China prefers to achieve negotiated outcomes ‘peacefully’: the ‘talk-and-take’ approach. This tactic permits China to gradually secure its goals in contested areas while it simultaneously engages in long-drawn-out negotiation with the target states. The South China Sea situation is a classic example of ‘talk-and-take’ by the PRC. The dialogue between China and the ASEAN group of nations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea has been going on for more than two decades. During this time, the PRC has seized several maritime features through ‘creeping annexation’, creating a dilemma for the target states (ASEAN) on how to respond without risking escalation because they fear the consequences of an open military confrontation with China. In its more extreme form, the talk-and-take tactic is combined with an actual threat, display or use of force, as is the case with the Philippines. Also known as the ‘boiling frog’ strategy, it wears down the target state by constantly threatening the use of force if it does not negotiate, but without the ‘victim’ being able to judge when the force will be applied. It thus dilutes the resolve of the target state to resist while also keeping other potential players outside the arena by refusing or rejecting offers of mediation or of playing the good Samaritan.
In India’s case, however, the PRC adopts a different variant of the same tactic, known as ‘fight-and-talk’. This idea was developed during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958. It is aimed at creating two arenas – a fighting arena and a talking arena – in order to retain the initiative in the military crisis through the selective application of force at the times of China’s choosing, while simultaneously forcing a desirable outcome through the negotiations….”
Read full article at firstpost.com
